The global recession of The depth, scale, and duration of the recession associated with the fi nancial crisis triggered monetary and fi scal policy responses by central banks and government authorities that in some cases were unconventional in size and scope. Many central banks with policy rates at or near the lower bound of zero percent turned to other stabilization tools, which altered the size and composition of their balance sheets. The Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, for example, implemented large-scale asset purchase programs. In addition, authorities in several countries sought to address the crisis through sizable fi scal stimulus packages involving tax cuts and higher public spending. By spring 2009, infl ation and output growth expectations seemed to have stabilized (Chart 1). Stocks and other assets also rebounded around that time (Chart 2).
T he global recession of 2008-09 resulted in a signifi cant loss of output (GDP), a large increase in unemployment, and a defl ationary scare in many countries. Indeed, forecasters' expectations of infl ation and GDP growth deteriorated in fall 2008, particularly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September.
The depth, scale, and duration of the recession associated with the fi nancial crisis triggered monetary and fi scal policy responses by central banks and government authorities that in some cases were unconventional in size and scope. Many central banks with policy rates at or near the lower bound of zero percent turned to other stabilization tools, which altered the size and composition of their balance sheets. The Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, for example, implemented large-scale asset purchase programs. In addition, authorities in several countries sought to address the crisis through sizable fi scal stimulus packages involving tax cuts and higher public spending. By spring 2009, infl ation and output growth expectations seemed to have stabilized (Chart 1). Stocks and other assets also rebounded around that time (Chart 2).
Assessing the role of monetary and fi scal policies in the stabilization process is a key challenge, and the subject of an intense debate among policymakers, academics, and the public. In this edition of Current Issues, we use cross-country data to investigate the relationship between policies put in place during the global recession and their infl uence on forecasters' output and infl ation expectations. We focus on expectations because they may convey more information about the effectiveness of policies than economic outcomes do. Forecasters adjust expectations quickly after policies are announced; therefore, expectations are less affected by additional changes in economic conditions that could occur once the policies are implemented.
We fi nd that expansionary monetary and fi scal policies, overall, were successful in shaping expectations of a recovery. Forecasters raised their expectations of infl ation and GDP growth following implementation of the policies. In particular, monetary expansions appear to have affected infl ation forecasts while fi scal policies seem to have infl uenced expectations of economic growth. From this perspective, the policies were effective at stimulating economic activity and preventing defl ationary pressures during the global recession.
Monetary and Fiscal Responses to Recessions
The recession of 2008-09 differed from past downturns in several ways. First, it was unusually deep, producing the most severe fall in U.S. output since the Great Depression. Second, it was a global recession, affecting not only the United States but most developed and emerging economies. Third, it was associated with a fi nancial crisis that led to unusual uncertainty about the economic outlook; past fi nancial crises have normally been associated with prolonged economic downturns and slower recoveries.
In typical recessions, central banks respond through mone tary policy actions, for example, by lowering interest rates; fiscal policy relies on automatic stabilizers (fiscal deficits automatically increase as tax revenues fall and social safety net outlays, such as unemployment insurance payments, rise). In contrast, the severity of the recent financial crisis required these conventional responses to be complemented by more aggressive measures, such as the expansion of central bank balance sheets and the use of large fi scal stimulus packages. In this section, we briefly review the rationale for the monetary and fiscal policies put in place in response to the recession and the potential transmission mechanisms between the policies and forecasters' expectations of output and inflation.
Central Bank Balance Sheet Expansions
The increases in central bank balance sheets observed during the crisis refl ect a variety of policy measures with different aims and transmission mechanisms. A useful classifi cation of alternative forms of balance sheet policies 1 makes a distinction between: 1) exchange rate-related policy, designed to affect the level and volatility of the exchange rate; 2) quasi-debt-management policy, intended to lower borrowing costs and raise asset prices; 3) credit policy, designed to improve fi nancing conditions in specifi c private sector debt markets; and 4) bank reserves policy, aimed at boosting lending and stimulating aggregate demand. The size of the balance sheet is not only a by-product of the fi rst three policies, but also a direct objective of bank reserves policy.
Exchange Rate-Related Policy
Some policies, such as those implemented by the Swiss National Bank and the Bank of Israel, focused on the foreign exchange market. To prevent excessive currency appreciation, central banks can purchase foreign currency, which also increases the size of their balance sheet. By limiting currency appreciation or generating currency depreciation, such interventions should boost demand for exports and prevent infl ation from falling.
Quasi-Debt-Management Policy and Credit Policy
Some measures were designed to lower borrowing costs; two of these are quasi-debt-management policy and credit policy. For example, one policy measure behind the large increase in balance sheets during the crisis was asset purchases by central 1 See Borio and Disyatat (2010) . banks, such as the Federal Reserve's large-scale purchases or the Bank of England's "quantitative easing" purchase program. Asset purchases may raise asset prices through the so-called "portfolio balance effect": for instance, purchases of private sector assets, by increasing demand for them, raise asset prices and improve liquidity conditions. Higher asset prices imply greater wealth for those who hold the assets and lower borrowing costs for consumers and fi rms. This stimulates aggregate demand, which in turn tends to put upward pressure on prices. (For further details, see Joyce, Tong, and Woods [2011] , who describe the quantitative easing policy implemented by the Bank of England.)
Bank Reserves Policy
The size of central bank balance sheets can also have a direct effect on aggregate demand. As an example, consider the policy of quantitative easing pursued by the Bank of England. The Bank bought fi nancial assets (overwhelmingly government debt) with the aim of "boosting the supply of money and credit and thus raising the rate of growth of nominal spending to a level consistent with meeting the infl ation target in the medium term. " 2 Quantitative easing is designed to affect output growth and infl ation via two distinct channels: through its effect on asset prices and through its effect on the supply of credit. 3 Asset purchases, by exchanging assets with reserves, increase the amount of funds available to fi nancial institutions and should lead to greater lending. Through both channels, aggregate spending increases: Consumers and fi rms are likely to spend more if their wealth increases, if it is easier for them to obtain loans, and if they hold more money in their accounts. Finally, higher spending also places upward pressure on prices and wages, thus raising infl ation.
Fiscal Stimulus
The fi scal stimulus packages implemented during the recession of 2008-09 included a mix of government spending increases and tax cuts. Both measures were designed to stabilize economic activity and infl ation by stimulating aggregate spending.
An increase in government spending has a direct effect on the economy by inducing higher demand for goods and services. The resulting rise in income and employment also provides an indirect effect by stimulating higher private consumption, as households and fi rms gain more purchasing power. While the size of this "fi scal multiplier" is the subject of strong debate among policymakers and academics, there is agreement on the fact that it depends on both the current state of the economy and the stance of monetary policy. If an economy is growing at close to its full potential and infl ation is near the desired level, an increase in government spending produces excess aggregate demand, putting upward pressure on wages and prices. If, in response, the central bank hikes interest rates, raising the cost of borrowing for households and fi rms, then higher demand from expansionary fi scal policy is partly offset by lower private spending, dampening the expansionary effects of the fi scal stimulus. If an economy is in a recession, with low resource utilization and with infl ation below the level consistent with the central bank's mandate, an increase in government spending has the appealing feature of boosting both aggregate demand and infl ation. Under these circumstances, the central bank is likely to keep interest rates low or stable until the recovery begins, thus preventing the crowding out that would otherwise reduce the fi scal multiplier. When central banks lower rates to or close to the "zero lower bound" in a deep recession, market participants might expect the effects of fi scal stimulus to be large.
Unlike higher government spending, lower taxes imply more disposable income for households and fi rms. Some or all of this increase in disposable income is usually saved. Economic theory suggests that a considerable fraction of a tax cut may be saved, as households recognize their need to pay for future tax increases in times of fi scal consolidation. Empirical evidence also suggests that increases in government spending have stronger effects on the economy than tax cuts do. However, during a fi nancial crisis, many households and fi rms may face rising costs of borrowing and diminished access to credit markets because their private wealth has been reduced. Here, a tax cut can restore the ability to spend and should therefore have more stimulative effects on aggregate spending as well as contribute to upward pressure on infl ation. 4
Evaluating the Expected Effects of Policies during the Great Recession
To the extent that monetary and fi scal policies are viewed as expansionary, they should have an immediate impact on expectations. Economic theory also assigns a key role to expectations in the policy transmission mechanism. For example, increased optimism about future economic growth is likely to stimulate spending by households and fi rms today. Also, higher infl ation expectations may reduce the real cost of borrowing for households and fi rms, and thus boost economic activity.
Several studies have looked at the effect of policy interventions on fi nancial markets during the crisis, focusing mainly on liquidity facilities and asset purchases introduced by central banks in 2008-09. To distinguish movements in asset prices attributable to changes in policy from movements caused by other factors, one strand of the literature has employed the event-study methodology, examining changes in asset prices during a narrow time window around the policy announcement or the actual policy intervention. 5 The underlying assumption used to identify the effect of policy is that, during this short window-typically ranging from a few minutes to a few days-
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any changes in fi nancial markets will solely refl ect the impact of the policy announcement, because the economic environment is otherwise unchanged. Other studies have focused on the effect of policy interventions on fi nancial markets over a longer period. 6 Recent studies by Baumeister and Benati (2010) and Cúrdia and Ferrero (2011) analyze the effects of a policy-induced reduction in long-term bond yields on economic activity and infl ation. While Baumeister and Benati fi nd large effects for the United States, Japan, and the euro area, Cúrdia and Ferrero, focusing only on the United States, fi nd positive but small effects.
We take a different approach. First, recall that we assess the potential effects of policies on expectations of infl ation and output growth rather than on fi nancial variables or realized measures of economic activity and infl ation. We use data on a crosssection of countries to evaluate these policy effects. And our methodology exploits differences in the evolution of expectations across countries that are associated with differences in policy. 7 As an example, consider an expansion in central bank balance sheets during the crisis: if stronger balance sheet growth-corresponding to looser monetary policy-increased expectations of future infl ation, then one should expect countries with higher balance sheet expansions on average to experience larger increases (or smaller decreases) in infl ation expectations.
Measures of Infl ation and Output Growth Expectations
To measure expectations of infl ation and output growth, we use data from Consensus Economics, a fi rm that conducts international economic surveys. Each month, Consensus Economics collects forecasts for a set of macroeconomic and fi nancial variables for advanced economies and selected emerging economies from a range of fi nancial analysts. The forecasts are for year-over-year growth rates in the consumer price index and in real GDP. 8 From this data set, we use the mean of analysts' forecasts of infl ation and GDP growth. Our sample includes the Group of Twenty (G-20) economies except for Indonesia and the euro-area countries except for Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 9 To broaden the data set, we also include Denmark, Hungary, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Thailand. the face of safe-haven fl ows. 12 Similarly, the gradual expansion of the Bank of Israel's balance sheet over the 2008-09 period refl ects the Bank's foreign exchange interventions.
Monetary authorities in some of our sample countries had been experiencing strong balance sheet expansions for a few years prior to the 2008-09 recession, likely as a by-product of their monetary and exchange rate arrangements. Therefore, to measure the extent to which expansions during the crisis were "unconventional, " we consider deviations from average rates of balance sheet expansion calculated in a precrisis period. We refer to such deviations as "detrended balance sheet growth. " Concretely, for each monetary authority, we calculate "average growth" as the annual rate of balance sheet expansion between January 2005 and June 2007. We then subtract ten months of "average growth" from the February-December 2009 balance sheet change. For euro-area countries, we use the detrended balance sheet growth of the Eurosystem, since monetary decisions are made centrally by the European Central Bank (ECB).
Measuring Fiscal Expansions during the Crisis
In 2008-09, faced with a collapse in economic activity and rising unemployment, most governments in our sample countries introduced fi scal stimulus packages to boost their economies. The data we use to study these efforts combine information from Prasad and Sorkin (2009) with announcements made by national authorities in late 2008 through April 2009. Stimulus packages averaged slightly less than 3 percent of GDP in these countries. However, there was considerable variation in size, with the bottom quarter of countries implementing packages with an average size of 1 percent of GDP and the top quarter enacting packages reaching about 4 percent.
Of note, our measure of fi scal stimulus does not distinguish between tax cuts and spending increases. Most countries implemented a mix of government spending and tax cuts. Prasad and Sorkin (2009) fi nd that among G-20 countries, the share of tax cuts was about 30 percent of total stimulus, but again there is considerable variation across countries. For example, they report that in the United States the share of tax cuts was about 45 percent, while countries like the United Kingdom and Brazil relied almost exclusively on them. In contrast, China relied largely on increased government spending.
Balance Sheet Expansions and Changes in Expectations
We now consider the relationship between central bank balance sheet expansions and changes in forecasters' expectations for 12 The Swiss National Bank announced in March 2009 that it would begin to intervene in the currency market to prevent a further appreciation of the Swiss franc against the euro. This intervention, which continued into 2010, was only partially sterilized. In addition, the Swiss National Bank purchased bonds issued by the private sector and lowered its target range for the three-month Libor (London interbank offered rate) to 0-0.75 percent, aiming for the lower end of the target band. The size of the data points is equal to a constant plus the size of the detrended balance sheet expansion (note that several central banks experience a balance sheet decline between February and December 2009 once we subtract trend growth). We add a constant so all data points are visible. . That is, the bigger circles in the chart tend to be associated with the "warmer" colors. We caution, however, that while the chart suggests a relationship between balance sheet expansions and changes in expectations, it does not necessarily mean that the former leads to the latter.
Estimation Results
To investigate further the relationship between balance sheet expansions and changes in expectations, we run cross-country regressions of changes in expectations of infl ation and GDP growth between March and July 2009 on measures of detrended central bank balance sheet growth and fi scal expansions (see Model 1 in the box). From the discussion above, we should expect both monetary and fi scal stimulus variables to increase expected output growth and infl ation.
Note that the size of the coeffi cients on fi scal stimulus is not directly comparable to the estimates of fi scal multipliers discussed in the academic and policy debate. Recall that we look at the effect of fi scal expansions on expectations of economic growth rather than on economic outcomes. Also, we do not distinguish between fi scal expansions consisting of tax cuts or spending increases, actions that could potentially have different effects on economic activity. Table 1 
Regression Analysis
To evaluate the relationship between monetary and fiscal stimulus and expectations, we estimate three statistical models. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares.
Model 1:

BalSheetChg i FiscalStimulus i
BalSheetChg i FiscalStimulus i
. (1) Here , the subscript i represents the country. The variables and denote changes in expectations of inflation and growth in a given year Y; in particular, represents the change between March and July 2009 in the benchmark specification. BalSheetChg i and FiscalStimulus i denote above-trend growth in the central bank's balance sheet and fiscal stimulus. The coefficient measures the percentage change in inflation expectations associated with a 1 percent change in the balance sheet size relative to its trend. Similarly, the coefficient measures the change in inflation expectations (in basis points) associated with a 1 percent change in the fiscal stimulus package expressed as a fraction of GDP.
We also estimate an alternative version of Model 1, augmented with an additional variable. 
Model 2:
Here, coefficients with the subscript LB capture the relationship with fiscal stimulus when the policy rate is at the lower bound. Second, consider the following alternative explanation for the observed positive relationship between monetary and fi scal stimulus measures and changes in expectations. On the one hand, countries that experienced a larger deterioration in expectations before March 2009 were more likely to adopt these measures. On the other hand, suppose that the change in expectations after March 2009 was related to the degree of deterioration in expectations observed earlier, and would have occurred even in the absence of stimulus packages. Intuitively, one could argue that countries that initially experienced a larger deterioration in expectations were inherently more likely to experience a larger rebound or a stabilization in expectations later-for example, because the extent of the decline in expectations in late 2008 and early 2009 was an overreaction to the escalation of the fi nancial crisis following the Lehman bankruptcy, or because the deterioration and subsequent stabilization of expectations were driven mainly by some other factor. According to this scenario, policy adoption and the rebound in expectations would be statistically related even when monetary and fi scal policies had no effect on the economy. By including in the regression a measure of the degree of deterioration in expectations before March 2009, we can evaluate whether for two countries with similar drops in expectations before then, the country that implemented a more aggressive policy response had a larger rebound in expectations.
The estimated coeffi cients in Table 2 show that our conclusions are unchanged when controlling for changes in expectations before March 2009: Monetary and fi scal stimulus measures implemented in 2008-09 were associated with increases in expectations of output growth and infl ation.
The Impact of Fiscal Policy at the Lower Bound
Recall that the stimulative effects of expansionary fi scal policy may depend on whether policy rates were at the lower bound (Model 3 in the box). To determine which countries' rates were at the lower bound, we look at how policy rates evolved over time.
In particular, we assume that for a country to be included in the lower-bound group, the central bank must have left the policy rate unchanged or cut the rate by at most 25 basis points in the March-July 2009 period, and that afterwards the rate must have In line with our previous fi ndings, only central bank balance sheet growth has a signifi cant relationship with infl ation expectations (Table 3) . In countries where policy rates were at the lower bound, fi scal stimulus is associated with an increase in expectations of GDP growth in 2009 and 2010. The estimated effects are highly signifi cant. In contrast, for countries that are not in the lower-bound group, fi scal expansions are not associated with a statistically signifi cant effect on growth expectations. Quantitatively, the results suggest that for countries whose policy rates were at or close to the lower bound, a fi scal stimulus equal to 1 percent of GDP is associated with a cumulative increase in expectations between March and July 2009 of 0.20 percent for 2009 GDP growth and 0.13 percent for 2010 growth. These results are consistent with the view that fi scal stimulus is more effective when interest rates are at the lower bound.
14 The ECB is not classifi ed as belonging to the lower-bound group because it cut its policy rate by 50 basis points between March and May 2009.
Interpreting the Results
Our regression results document a relationship between policies implemented and changes in expectations. The key question when interpreting our fi ndings is whether the link between policies implemented during the crisis and the stabilization of infl ation and growth expectations observed after March 2009 refl ects a causal relationship. First, it is possible that our regressions have omitted variables that drive both changes in expectations and policymakers' decisions to adopt or not adopt specifi c policies. If this is the case, the estimated effect of policy on changes in expectations may in fact refl ect the infl uence of other factors that are not accounted for in the regressions. Variables that come to mind include economic conditions before the adoption of policies-which we attempted to capture by controlling for the degree of deterioration in expectations before March 2009-and the level of policy rates before the adoption of unconventional monetary policies. 15
Another potential issue arises because the decision by monetary and fi scal authorities to adopt certain policies is endogenous, that is, it may be directly infl uenced by the evolution of expectations that we have used as dependent variables in the regressions. If this is true, the estimated coeffi cients in our regressions will be affected by simultaneous equation bias. However, even if this is the case, the effect of this bias is likely to work against the discovery of a positive link between policy and stabilization in expectations. This is because policymakers arguably would have been less likely to expand the size of their interventions further if they observed a rebound in expectations. Therefore, our results may well understate the true impact of policy interventions during the crisis.
Alternative Measures of Balance Sheet Expansion
We chose above-average balance sheet growth as one objective measure of unconventional monetary policy because it is available for a relatively large set of countries. However, it is not immediately clear over which time period balance sheet growth should be measured. In our regression analysis, we measured balance sheet expansions as the change between February and December 2009. This long time period is intended to capture balance sheet expansions that were already announced or anticipated by July 2009 (the end of the period over which changes in expectations are measured). Not all central banks in our sample countries, however, announced specifi c increases in their balance sheets. Therefore, we consider several alternative specifi cations for the time window over which balance sheet growth is measured. First, we compute balance sheet growth between February and July 2009, in line with the measured change in expectations. The estimated regression coeffi cients under this alternative specifi cation are very similar to our baseline results. Second, for many central 15 The results are robust to the inclusion of the level of policy rates in fall 2008 as a control variable in equation 1. Details are available from the authors upon request. Using these alternative measures, we fi nd that our results are qualitatively the same and quantitatively very similar to those obtained using our regression analysis reported in Tables 1-3 . Furthermore, the results are robust if we use changes in headline balance sheets instead of the detrended measures. In sum, alternative specifi cations of the balance sheet variable do not affect our main fi ndings. 16 
Conclusion
Were the expansionary monetary and fi scal policy measures implemented during the fi nancial crisis effective? We fi nd a positive link between the policies and measures of infl ation and real GDP growth expectations. After the implementation of various policy initiatives, forecasters raised their expectations of infl ation and GDP growth. Their response indicates that the policies were, to some degree, successful in shaping expectations. Our study suggests that both monetary and fi scal stimulus had an impact on expectations, and that the efforts complemented each other. Monetary expansions appear to have had an effect on infl ation forecasts while fi scal policies seem to have helped stabilize expectations of economic growth. These policies, however, should not be considered in isolation. For example, countries in which interest rates were close to or at the zero lower bound displayed higher "fi scal multipliers, " suggesting that specifi c monetary and fi scal confi gurations can have substantially different effects on expectations, depending on each country's unique economic conditions.
16 Details are available from the authors upon request.
